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1. Introduction  
The reforms in Russian agriculture initiated in the beginning of the 90s re-
sulted in a substantial decline of agricultural production and productivity in the 
years thereafter (OSBORNE and TRUEBLOOD, 2002; SVETLOV, 2002). The perfor-
mance of the agricultural sector is and most likely will be determined by the per-
formance of large-scale farms, the successors of former sovkhozes and kolkhozes.  
Large-scale farms operate 82-85% of total agricultural land and remain the main 
producers of grain, meat, eggs and milk in Russia. High indebtedness of agricul-
tural producers suggests a poor sectoral performance: in 2000, about 80% of Rus-
sian farms had overdue debts. Indebtedness or, in other words, capital structure, 
can be a result, as well as a cause of poor performance. In the finance literature, 
capital structure is studied in both directions. In transition economies, economists 
explain the debt accumulation problem as a result of supply or demand shocks, 
tightening of the credit conditions, absence of bankruptcy and land markets (see 
SEDIK et al., 2000a; YASTREBOVA, 2001). Since Russian agriculture has been high-
ly indebted for many years already, the consequences for individual farm and sec-
tor performance are of importance.   
Parallel with accumulating high debts, the enterprises experience cuts in 
subsidies – the key element of price policy in the centralized Russian economy as 
they compensated for the difference between administered prices and actual costs 
of products. Despite declining trends in both output and subsidies, the share of 
subsidies in the regional agricultural output remains about 12.5 % in 1997-1998 
(see MINSELKHOZPROD, 2000). About 95% of dairy farms in the region received 
subsidies in 1996-2000 that in one way or another underlines their contribution to 
performance.  
In different fields of research, performance is measured with different indi-
cators. In production economics, technical efficiency is often used while in corpo-
rate finance the performance is usually measured as profitability or Tobin’s Q rep-
resenting the value of a firm. In this study, the degree of technical efficiency (TE) 
attained by farm businesses is used as a performance indicator. TE contributes di-
rectly to resource productivity and provides a clear signal of managerial effective-
ness. Thus it is a significant determinant of business performance. 
 The impact of capital structure and subsidies on resource allocation and 
performance may be positive or negative. At the micro level, subsidies can create 
impediments to competition through unequal conditions for functioning of the 
farms. Furthermore, they can lead to ineffective distribution of resources, give 
wrong market signals and perpetuate loss-making enterprises (LEGEIDA, 2001). 
High debts can either hamper the opportunities of borrowings aimed at timely fi-
nancing of production or be a source of production expansion, ensuring sufficient 
financing of production and investments. 
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A considerable number of applications studied the efficiency of firms in ag-
riculture, including those in Central and Eastern Europe. Much of the work on ef-
ficiency in Russian agriculture has been limited to the analysis of aggregate (Ob-
last level) data (ARNADE and GOPINATH, 2000; SEDIK et al., 2000b; SOTNIKOV, 
1998; VOIGT and UVAROVSKY, 2001). There are no studies on technical efficiency, 
to the best of the authors knowledge, at the Russian individual farm level; the ma-
jor reason being a lack of data. There are limited applications to Russian agricul-
tural data that introduce financial characteristics, i.e. debt structure in the study of 
financial performance of large-scale farms from St.-Petersburg region (EPSTEIN, 
2001) and Volgograd region (SCHULZE et al., 2001). SCHULZE et al. (2001) find no 
statistically significant relation between profitability and absolute level of debts 
payable. Analysis of aggregated data in SEDIK et al. (2000b) shows a negative im-
pact of subsidies on technical efficiency of Russian crop producers in 1991-1995.  
In Russian agriculture, the relationship between capital structure (debt-to-
asset ratio) and efficiency, subsidies and efficiency remains unclear. This study at-
tempts to shed some light on these relationships. The paper is organized as fol-
lows. The next section proceeds with a description of the indebtedness problems 
and subsidy programs in Russian agriculture. This is followed by a review of fi-
nancial theory concepts (agency cost, free cash flow, and credit evaluation con-
cepts) and soft budget constraint theories that contribute to explaining the relation 
between debts and efficiency. The methodological approach of two-stage model-
ing is presented in section 4. Section 5 summarizes the data and presents the de-
scription of variables. Section 6 presents the research findings. Conclusions are 
found in Section 7.  
 
2. Subsidies and farm indebtedness in the 90’s  
 
To understand the motivation of the study, it is helpful to briefly review 
debt accumulation problem in Russian agriculture and also to give a general de-
scription of a sector performance.  
Ten years of transition from the socialist system to a market economy have 
brought an invaluable experience to the whole Russian economy and to its sectors, 
including agriculture. Large collective (kolkhozes) and state (sovkhozes) farms 
passed through the reorganization and restructuring campaign initiated in 1991-
1992. Recent studies in the Ukraine and Russia showed that about half of the farm 
employees reports that no real change has taken place so far in ‘reorganised’ 
farms, i.e. the internal management, actual organization, and work incentives did 
not really change (LIEFERT and SWINNEN, 2002; MACOURS and SWINNEN, 2000). 
Since 1992, agricultural producers had to face the new operating environment 
characterized by price liberalization, abolishment of state procurement and cuts in 
state subsidies. As can be seen in Table 1, both the level of subsidies granted to 
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dairy farms in Moscow region and percentage of subsidies in agricultural revenue 
decreased dramatically in the period 1996-2000 and especially right after the year 
of financial crisis (1998) lowering down to 2.4% in 2000.  
After an initial fall in agricultural production, Russian agriculture was ex-
pected to recover significantly. However, gross agricultural output (GAO) has de-
clined by over 40% between 1991-19981, and more than half of the enterprises 
were unprofitable since 1994. In 1997, the sector demonstrated a small economic 
growth of 1.7%. After stabilization of the sector in 1999-2001, agriculture is ex-
pected to grow by 3-4% (LIEFERT and OSBORNE, 2002). However, the problem 
with high debts accumulated in the sector remains unresolved.  
The level of debts both long- and short-term in constant prices increased 
throughout 1995-2000 by 150%. As can be seen from Table 1, short-term debts 
(85%) having accounts payable as the main component (75%) prevail over long-
term debts (15%). The largest component of debt payables on Moscow dairy farms 
in 1996-2000 is debt to suppliers (55%).  Tax arrears together with debts to social 
insurance funds constitute 28%, wage arrears – 8%. It is remarkable that the nature 
of debts differs from that in western agriculture where the major part of debts is 
from commercial (agricultural) banks. The discussion on implication of different 
sources of debts follows in section 3.2. 
Table 1 here 
The change in the structure of payables reflects the changing attitude of 
farms towards their business partners. Much depends on the attitude of creditors as 
well. The composition of overall farm debts on Moscow region dairy farms 
changed in several ways that mostly repeats the dynamics observed for all Russian 
farms (see YASTREBOVA, 2001). First, during the period 1996-2000, the percentage 
of debt on credits decreased, and percentage of accounts payable increased accord-
ingly. Second, payables to especially social funds (pension, medical insurance, ed-
ucation, etc.) grew rapidly. In contrast, the share of debts to suppliers remains 
above 40%, reflecting the importance of non-commercial creditors for farms.  
As can be seen, both the level of subsidies and percentage of subsidies in 
agricultural revenue decreased right after the 1998 financial crisis. Subsidies for 
milk remain the main component of livestock subsidies, although their share in 
gross subsidies reduced over the years. The proportion between regional (80%) 
and federal (20%) subsidies remains more or less constant over the years indicat-
ing no major changes in subsidizing programs.  
Attempts of the government to resolve the financial problems of the farming 
sector by introducing formal procedures, like debt restructuring or bankruptcy pro-
cedures, have not improved the financial situation on the farms so far 
                                                          
1 This figure is given for all types of producers. Gross agricultural output by agricultural enterprises reduced even 
more dramatically: 1991-1998 by 60%. Given the tendency to overreport production during the Soviet era, the actu-
al output drop may have been somewhat smaller (OSBORNE and TRUEBLOOD, 2002).  
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(YASTREBOVA, 2001). A long-term crisis management strategy is lacking and as a 
result, most farms continue to carry the burden of historical debts. The problem of 
the weakest farms is solved through different reorganisation options, including ac-
tual liquidation without using the formal bankruptcy procedure such as takeovers 
by strong farms and other businesses, offers for leasing of residual assets, separa-
tion through daughter companies, etc. This improves the utilisation of resources of 
hopeless companies, but does not resolve the pressing issue of debts in the farming 
sector.  
3. Financial Concepts and Farm-Level Efficiency 
 
This section addresses to finance theories that explain the effect of capital 
structure on firm performance. Next, it raises the issues relevant for application of 
these theories to Russian agriculture under existence of soft budget constraints. 
3.1 Financial concepts in market economies 
MODIGLIANI and MILLER (1958) conclude in their seminal paper that the 
capitalstructure is irrelevant to firm value under a set of strong assumptions. Stud-
ies on debt structure and its relevance for performance are often found in the em-
pirical corporate finance literature referring to applications in industrial corporate 
sector. There are two different arguments in favor of positive or negative impact of 
high indebtedness on performance of a firm. The agency cost concept in finance 
originated by JENSEN and MECKLING (1976), hypothesizes that monitoring, bond-
ing, and adverse incentive costs are incurred in a borrower-lender relationship in 
order to resolve problems of asymmetric information and misaligned incentives 
between the two parties. Various practices may be utilized to reduce these agency 
costs (reporting requirements, reputation effects, penalties) that in any case in-
creases the costs of firm operation and lowers efficiency. 
In contrast, the free cash flow concept developed by JENSEN, 1986) suggests 
a positive effect of high debts on performance. According to this concept, agents 
with excess cash flows and abundant financial assets may exercise managerial lax-
ness, devote insufficient attention to detail, and squander resources in nonbusiness 
uses. Managers faced with high debt obligations increase their effort, thereby en-
hancing technical efficiency and business performance.  
The credit evaluation concept suggests that lenders will prefer to finance 
more efficient farmers because these borrowers have lower credit risks (ELLINGER 
et al., 1992). Agricultural bankers often use management/efficiency variables (i.e. 
operating costs per acre, yield per acre, profit per cow, etc) along with various fi-
nancial variables in evaluating creditworthiness. Use of greater financial leverage 
by some borrowers could represent certification of greater technical efficiency, 
through the lender’s favorable evaluation of the borrower’s creditworthiness and 
the resulting loan decisions. Also, farms that manage to attract new credits likely 
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demonstrate higher efficiency, since higher efficiency indicates their creditworthi-
ness. Thus, the credit evaluation concept suggests positive relationship between 
technical efficiency and debt-to-asset ratio (NASR et al., 1998). 
Following these theories, any relation between debt and performance can be 
expected. In agriculture, these concepts are applied in studying the relation be-
tween capital structure and technical efficiency of American grain farms (NASR et 
al., 1998) with the outcome in support of Jensen’s free cash flow concept. 
 
3.2 Application of financial concepts to Russian agriculture  
Before applying these concepts and formulating the hypotheses about the ef-
fect of farm indebtedness on its performance, it is useful to recall that these con-
cepts were developed for firms operating in market economies. It necessitates cau-
tion in their application to a transition economy. First, these concepts assume well-
functioning credit markets, i.e. credit supply always meets credit demand. In Rus-
sia, the commercial credit market for agriculture is underdeveloped because of 
riskiness and low profitability of this business. Second, the leading role of com-
mercial credit in developed economies and its minor role in transition economies 
was already mentioned in section 2. And finally, in developed countries firms with 
excessive obligations unlikely continue their business, whereas in Russian agricul-
ture this is quite widely observed. Concluding, in Russian settings the Jensen’s 
theory may not lead to finding a positive effect of debts due to their excessiveness. 
Moreover, this theory is mainly applicable to debts issued by commercial credi-
tors, which impose strict regulations on borrowers2.  
The hypothesis about positive relationship between technical efficiency and 
debt-to-asset ratio that follows from the credit evaluation concept needs some jus-
tification for Russian agricultural enterprises. Since short-term debts on credits and 
loans have relatively little share in total and current debts (see Table 1), the credi-
tors are not able to determine creditworthiness of a borrower while observing his 
debt-to-asset ratio because high debts in Russian context certainly do not indicate 
large bank loans but large debts to suppliers and the state. Thus, the credit evalua-
tion concept fails when debt-to-asset ratio is analyzed. The ratio of new short-term 
credit to total assets may reveal a positive relation under the hypothesis that effi-
ciency of farms that attract new bank loans is higher.  
A positive impact of debts becomes likely when farms generate debts in or-
der to use them as working capital to keep business operating instead of going 
bankrupt. The short-term debt payables may likely serve farms with working capi-
                                                          
2 It is not so easy to define such creditors in Russian agriculture, because agrobanks, which are appointed 
by the government and distribute state money, issue loans. Thus, bank loans may not represent the same sort of 
debts the financial theory is analyzing. 
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tal (“trade credit”), in which case a positive relation may be expected. This reason-
ing, though leading to an expectation of a positive sign, does not correspond with 
Jensen’s free cash flow concept.  
There is some evidence in support of the agency cost concept on negative 
effect of debts associated with increasing costs. Situations with high debts in many 
sectors of economy lead to barter transactions. Farms get inputs in exchange for 
their outputs or other services. In this case acquiring inputs is associated with 
higher transaction costs for producers (VARSHAVSKY, 2000). Empirical evidence 
for a negative impact of debts due to high transaction costs is presented in SEDIK et 
al., 2000a) for the case of Ukrainian agriculture. There is another explanation for 
the negative effect of debts. Firms that have already accumulated large debts, i.e. 
have poor financial reputation, will be more restricted than firms that have not, i.e. 
increasing the debts will reduce the current and future possibilities to use this ex-
emption to relieve liquidity constraints. The distinction between negative effect of 
SBCs and bad financial reputation of farms should be made.  
As can be concluded, it is rather difficult to present a clear link between dis-
cussed above theories and appropriate measures of capital structure in transition 
economy. The workaround is suggested by the theories of soft budget constraints 
(SBCs). The definition of the SBC that is used most often by Kornai is a subsidy 
paid, typically by the state, to loss-making firms to guarantee their survival. The 
subsidy is paid ex post, after the state observes the firm’s losses, without expecta-
tion of future repayment, and can take a variety of forms, e.g. direct budgetary 
subsidy, an injection of credit from the state or another institution, or a reduction 
in tax rates (SCHAFFER, 1998). In Kornai’s analysis, the cause of the SBC is “pa-
ternalism” by the state. The state will rescue a failing firm because it is unwilling 
to accept the social consequences (e.g. unemployment) of its closure. HART and 
MOORE (1995) provide a model that shows that the optimal capital structure of a 
firm is determined by the trade-off between “hard” and “soft” debts. They show 
that the optimal level of short-term debt is zero. However, long-term “hard” debt, 
which is not renegotiable, is important in limiting managers’ ability to raise new 
funds. With too much hard debt, managers would underinvest because the compa-
ny would be overmortaged.  
Studying the impact of capital structure on firm performance in a transition 
economy where SBCs are present, one would first focus on defying “soft” and 
“hard” debts in farm finance. According to the political-influence theory of the 
SBCs, the government pushes for surplus employment, and when losses are in-
curred, the subsidies are provided to bail out the enterprise. This theory is applica-
ble to Russian agriculture, since the use of surplus labor is reported in many stud-
ies (see e.g. BEZLEPKINA et al., 2001; LIEFERT and SWINNEN, 2002). For more the-
ories on SBCs one may consult MASKIN and XU (2001). 
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According to SCHAFFER (1998), the state in transition countries tends to sof-
ten the liquidity constraints by subsidising the firms and mostly by means of al-
lowing the enterprises to generate tax arrears that is a part of accounts payable. 
The SBC phenomenon in Russia reveals via governmental debt restructuring and 
forgiveness practice. Moreover, the law on bankruptcy has not been heavily ap-
plied to the farms and thus only a small percentage of highly indebted enterprises 
went through this procedure (OSBORNE and TRUEBLOOD, 2002).  Thus, under ab-
sence of bankruptcy threat and possibility to renegotiate debts, in other words un-
der SBCs, managers likely will exercise their laxness. This reasoning would imply 
a negative debt-performance relation. KONINGS et al. (2002) find a weak evidence 
for a negative relation between long-term debts and efficiency in Bulgarian econ-
omy interpreting it as the presence of SBCs. CARLIN et al. (2000) show the im-
portance of removing the soft budget constraints in achieving better performance 
of firms in transition economies.  
Jensen’s free cash flow concept, which is in line with SBC theory, may 
work well for explaining a negative impact of subsidies on managerial perfor-
mance. However, these subsidies are supposed to be Kornai-type subsidies that are 
granted to a loss-maker to keep it in operation. Subsidies granted to a financially 
healthy but politically powerful firm may reveal positive impact on performance 
(see CARLIN et al., 2000). The paternalizm model predicts that firms that make 
losses will be rescued, but there are other possible reasons, compatible with the ex-
istence of hard budget constraints, for loss-making farms to receive subsidies, such 
as e.g. product-specific subsidies (SCHAFFER, 1998). A negative relationship be-
tween subsidies and efficiency is found in KARAGIANNIS (2002) for analysis of 
Greek agriculture and in Sedik et al. (2000b) for Russian crop producers. Both 
studies support the hypothesis that farmers tend to put less effort on farming ac-
tivities as a larger part of their income is guarantied through subsidy.  
Summarizing, well defined for western economies financial concepts cannot 
be directly applied to Russian agriculture. First, appropriate measures to test these 
concepts should be identified. Distinguishing between debts with “soft” and 
“hard” nature is of great importance in this analysis. Different sources of debts 
may reveal different ways of influencing the managerial efforts and thus technical 
efficiency. Thus, it is reasonable to discriminate between debts from different 
creditors, e.g. commercial banks and others. Such discrimination also helps in as-
sessing the sensitivity of performance to a particular source of debts. Apart from 
different groups of creditors, capital structure involves the distinction between 
short-term obligations (to finance production and marketing) and long-term obli-
gations (to finance fixed assets). It is expected that short-term debts are stronger 
related to efficiency than long-term or total obligations because technical efficien-
cy refers to production and finance decisions having a short-term nature.  
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4. Methodology 
A two-stage methodology applied in this study is rather common. First, 
technical efficiency of farms is computed using Data Envelopment Analysis 
(DEA), a non-parametric method. Such measure of farm performance accounts for 
the relation between inputs and outputs on the farm. Second, the efficiency 
measures derived from DEA are regressed on the financial characteristics, such as 
debt to asset ratio, composition of debt (to suppliers, state and employees), subsidy 
rate and other socio-economic farm characteristics using a Tobit regression model.   
 
4.1 Efficiency measures: Technical, Pure technical, Scale and Congestion  
Modeling of farm production involves optimization of input and output mix. 
The DEA technique allows for both input and output orientation. In this study an 
input oriented model with the objective to produce the observed outputs with as 
little inputs as possible is used (FARE et al., 1994). Under the planned economy, 
agricultural enterprises had to comply with output targets even at cost inefficient 
use of resources. Often the current situation is compared to pre-reform period. 
Having limited options of state support in input supply, it is rather likely to assume 
that enterprises aim at minimizing costs to achieve pre-reform output levels. Earli-
er studies on Russian agriculture point to overuse of fixed inputs as land, workers 
(e.g. LIEFERT and SWINNEN, 2002). Input orientation is helpful in this context to 
allow for input congestion or in other words, for input slacks.  
Schematically, the production technology L transforming factors of produc-
tion (inputs x1 and x2) into a single output (y) is presented in Figure 1.  
                                      x2    
                                              S
                                                       L(y)
                                                                                 A
                                                            B
                                                                                         S’
                                        0                                                            x1
                                  Figure 1: Input orientation with inputs x1 and x2
                                    
L(y) denotes the subset of all input vectors (with a frontier of SS’) which 
yield at least y. In this case, the efficiency of production units in the interior of the 
frontier, can be measured by the distance to the frontier. For example, if a firm 
produces at point A, then its efficiency can be measured with the ratio of OB/OA.  
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DEA uses a piece-wise linear convex hull approach for frontier estimation. 
This can be achieved with mathematical programming (MP). Assuming there are 
data on K inputs and M outputs for each of N farms and variable returns to scale 
(VRS), pure technical efficiency (PTE) can be computed from the following linear 
programming (LP) model: 
min λn                                                             (1) 
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where  λn stands for input-oriented technical efficiency, zn are intensity vari-
ables. The value of λn attained is the pure technical efficiency score for the n-th 
firm. It will satisfy: λn  ≤ 1, with a value of 1 indicating a point on the frontier and 
hence a technically efficient firm. The linear programming problem must be 
solved N times, once for each firm in the sample.  
Overall technical efficiency is decomposed into its three components: (a) 
scale efficiency, (b) pure technical efficiency and c) congestion-free efficiency 
(FARE et al., 1994). The overall input-oriented technical efficiency measure and 
each component are computed for each farm to obtain the degree of inefficiency 
arising from (a) failure to operate at optimal size, (b) pure technical inefficiency 
and (c) congestion arising from the overutilization of some inputs. These calcula-
tions imply some standard changes in model (1), which can be found in (COELLI et 
al., 1999; FARE et al., 1994). Denoting constant returns to scale (CRS), variable 
returns to scale (VRS), strong disposability (SD) and weak disposability of inputs 
(WD), the resulting decomposition of the overall technical efficiency measure then 
looks as follows: 

SDandVRSunderefficiency technical pureunderSDefficiencyscaleSDandCRSunderefficiencytechnicaloverall
S)V,|xFi(y,S)|xSi(y,S)C,|xFi(y, ∗=  

WD and VRS underefficiencyVRSunderefficiency congestionSDandVRSunderefficiency technical pure
W)V,|xFi(y,V)|xCni(y,S)V,|xFi(y, ∗=  
The pure technical efficiency measure is more appropriately related to the 
testable hypotheses since it represents the ability of the firm to operate without 
wasting inputs rather than operating at an inappropriate scale. The scale efficiency, 
congestion efficiency and overall technical efficiency models are also studied to 
get some insight on relation between farm characteristics and inefficiency sources. 
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4.2 Two-Step Empirical Model 
A commonly used two-step procedure approach is employed to explain var-
iation of efficiency scores across firms. The first step is to estimate the efficiency 
scores, and the second step is to explain the variation of the efficiency scores using 
appropriate regression procedures.  
A few conceptual issues arise with this approach. First, the efficiency scores 
(scale efficiency, pure technical efficiency, and congestion-free efficiency) have 
an upper bound of 1.0 and a lower bound of 0.0. Thus, ordinary least square esti-
mates are inconsistent. A Tobit regression model is one way to overcome these 
problems (GREENE, 1997). 
In agricultural literature, it can be seen that often the efficiency measures are 
regressed on farm individual characteristics such as age, education, availability of 
a successor (for private farming). In Russian agricultural enterprises settings such 
managerial characteristics as age (the younger the easier adjusted to new environ-
ment), years of experience, involvement in local governance (networking) could 
be of importance. Unfortunately such data are unavailable. The choice of socio-
economic indicators is explained in section 5.2. Although the data set created for 
this study is panel, nonparametric efficiency measures are computed for each year 
independently.  
5. Data 
5.1 Data source 
Panel data of large-scale specialized dairy farms in the Moscow Region are 
obtained from data on Russian farms collected by the state statistical committee. 
The sample of specialised dairy farms includes farms for which the share of mar-
ketable milk production takes more than 2/3 of agricultural revenue. The unbal-
anced panel set contains 700 observations from 130-144 farms annually over the 
period 1996-2000. 
 On average, agricultural land area takes about 3200 ha, the average number 
of all employees per enterprise is 250 and there are about 800 dairy cows. On these 
farms, on average 71.8% of revenue comes from milk and 11.9% from beef pro-
duction. The shares of other livestock production (egg production, pig production) 
and arable farming (potato, cereals, vegetables and other) are 7.5% and 8.8%, re-
spectively.  
 
5.2 First-stage variables  
Five inputs and two outputs are distinguished in the first stage calculation of 
technical efficiency. Outputs are milk and other output (beef, pig meat, poultry 
meat, eggs, cereals, potato, vegetables). Variable input represents aggregated input 
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costs for marketable output. Implicit quantities of variable input and the two out-
puts are obtained as the ratio of costs and revenues and their price indices. Price 
indices for milk and variable inputs are taken from the national statistics 
(GOSKOMSTAT, 2002), whereas the Tornqvist price index (COELLI et al., 1999) is 
calculated for other output category on the base of national price indices and other 
output composition on individual farms. Price indexes vary over years but not over 
farms, implying that differences in the quality and composition of inputs and out-
puts are reflected in the quantity (see also COX and WOHLGENANT, 1986). Other 
inputs in the first stage are labour, land, capital, and livestock.  
Labour is measured as number of farm employees involved in agricultural 
production. This measure is not corrected for labor quality because of lack of data. 
Capital is measured as the value of depreciation. This measure does not resolve the 
potential problems with overvalued capital stock widely discussed in the literature 
(LISSITSA and ODENING, 2001; VOIGT and UVAROVSKY, 2001) but has an ad-
vantage of reflecting the costs of fixed capital involved in producing the earlier de-
fined outputs. Heads of livestock represent fixed capital invested in livestock. De-
preciation value is normalized by regional consumer price index. Descriptive char-
acteristics can be viewed in the upper part of Table 2. 
 
5.3 Second-stage variables 
Financial characteristics. This section presents measures of capital structure 
and defines a proxy for SBC. The data from balance sheets on debts and subsidies3 
are available at different degree of details for the period 1996-2000. The complete 
overview of farm accounting forms, the correspondence of variables among the 
forms can be found in MINSELKHOZ (2000). Total liabilities represent a sum of 
long-term and current obligations (credits and loans, accounts payable and divi-
dends)4.  Debts are disaggregated by their maturity and by creditors (banks and 
other creditors for debts on credits and loans; tax arrears, wage arrears, debts to the 
social development funds, to the suppliers for accounts payable). Accounting for 
the presence of SBC is necessary for separating their effect from capital structure 
effect. Following SCHAFFER (1998), one cannot conclude that firms have SBCs 
simply because they continue to make losses, even several years in a row, or be-
cause they have large stocks of overdue debts. Firms can be loss-making, or have 
large debts in arrears, and still have hard budget constraints so long as neither their 
creditors nor the state are rescuing the firm with the injections of cash or subsidies.  
First of all, the SBC, as discussed in section 3.2, is about rescuing firms in 
financial distress, e.g. firms with negative profit before tax. The source of the 
                                                          
3 Book keeping system on Russian agricultural enterprises presents the data on subsidies and compensations that are 
balanced out with debts to the state budgets or debts to suppliers depending on the scheme of mutual payments. The 
further description and analysis is confined only to the level of actually received subsidies.  
4 Lines 590+610+620+630 of a balance sheet. 
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firm’s losses do not matter in the paternalism model; it needs to be rescued wheth-
er or not it is economically unviable, e.g. has positive or negative operating profit, 
i.e. earnings before interest, profit tax, depreciation and other charges. Following 
SCHAFFER (1998), EBITD is a measure of the income generated by the firm that is 
available to pay obligations to creditors, the tax authorities, and is independent of 
the capital structure of the firm. Thus, we define farms in economic distress if 
sales profit minus depreciation is negative, EBITD<0 (line 050, financial statement 
plus line 640, form 5) and farms in financial distress if profit before tax (PBT) is 
negative, PBT<0 (line 140>0 in financial statement). Since profits are measured on 
an accruals, not a cash basis, neither EBITD<0, nor PBT<0 captures that a farm re-
ceives additional external financing. Yet, interest costs are accrued costs, not cash 
costs. Thus, farms that cover all its operating costs, i.e. EBITD>0, but highly in-
debted, i.e. PTB<0, do not have SBC, unless farms’ losses cause it to receive a net 
cash injection from the bank or another creditor.  
Dummy variable indicating the presence of SBC is constructed in a way that 
it takes value 1if a farm finds itself in both financial and economic distress and if 
the inflow of total debts plus gross subsidy exceeds the outflow of debts. As it was 
mentioned in section 2, about 80% of subsidies are granted from regional budgets 
and thus they are possibly the subject to negotiations between managers of loss-
making farms and governance authorities. The main part of subsidies is granted to 
livestock production, which demonstrates low/negative profits. The average ratio 
of subsidies to revenue is twice higher on economically (financially) distressed 
farms than on others. Due to these reasons we attribute all subsidies to Kornai-type 
subsidies, e.g. subsidies granted to loss-making farms under SBC. Therefore gross 
subsidies are accounted when constructing a SBC dummy. About 65% of dairy 
farms in the sample were under SBCs in 1996-1998. In 1999 this percentage 
dropped substantially to 10%, because of a reduced share of financially and eco-
nomically distressed farms. Descriptive characteristics can be found in the middle 
part of Table 2. All financial ratios are derived at the beginning of a corresponding 
year, thus referring to the initial financial conditions, under which the production 
runs.  
Socio-economic farm characteristics. While this study focuses on the rela-
tionship between a farm’s efficiency and financial indicators, it is important to ac-
count for the potential effects of other factors on efficiency. It is hypothesized that 
better working conditions improve efficiency. Wages per worker corrected for 
wage arrears represent working conditions on the farm. Soil rating depicts soil 
quality with the average score 100 for soils in Moscow region. This measure re-
flects differences in soil typography, uniformity, drainage, fertility and other quali-
ty attributes. It is likely that farmers with higher soil rating also may exhibit higher 
level of efficiency, perhaps reflecting the use of different types of technology. 
Years of transition in agriculture resulted in severe decline of heads of cows and 
their milk productivity, thus it is assumed that a higher managerial effort results in 
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higher partial input productivity leading to higher technical efficiency. Milk per 
cow indicates how well the livestock is managed. Distance from Moscow city to 
farm reflects access to urban markets. In this study it is hypothesized that farms 
located closer to Moscow city are more efficient (the farthest located farm is at 
163 km) because they have lower transport/transaction costs5. Dummy variable 
size takes value 1 for large farms. Farm size is assessed by the acreage of agricul-
tural land with its average value of 3500 ha. About 20% of farms in the sample 
have milk processing facilities6. It is expected that rather likely that farms having 
processing facilities at their disposal may run their production in a more efficient 
way. Therefore, percentage of processed milk (in kg of raw milk) is introduced 
among farm characteristics. Dummy variable for ownership type has a value 1 for 
farms with private ownership and 0 otherwise (municipal, state, mixed). It is ex-
pected to find that farms with private ownership are more efficient because share-
holders may demonstrate more efforts in disciplining farm management. On the 
other hand, noting that ownership regulations hardly work in Russia, shareholders 
“on paper” may not reveal any efforts but rather exploit opportunistic behaviour.  
Table 2 here 
 
6. Results  
Calculation of efficiency measures is performed in OnFront 2.0 software 
(FARE and GROSSKOPF, 2000) for five years with a separate frontier for each year. 
Technical efficiency and its decomposition are presented in Table 3. Minimum 
scores are above 60%.  
Table 3 here 
Before presenting the results of Tobit regression analysis, it is useful to 
highlight some findings from technical efficiency results. The results suggest that 
expenses could have been reduced on average by 14% without affecting total out-
put. A direct comparison of efficiency scores between years is not possible be-
cause different (annual) reference technologies are assumed. The percentage of ef-
ficient farms, e.g. farms with an efficiency score of unity, is assessed for each effi-
ciency measure over years.  The share of fully efficient enterprises under CRS in 
the first and last year of investigation reached 18%. Efficiency drops substantially 
in the year of financial crisis (1998); and there is a clear positive trend in efficien-
cy before and right after 1998. A similar pattern is observed for other efficiency 
measures. More than half of the farms remain inefficient during the whole period 
with the percentage of efficient farms increasing in 1996-1997, significantly fall-
ing in 1998 and recovering in 1999-2000. Scale efficiency (SE) is higher than pure 
                                                          
5 Cost of fuel contributes 12% on average to variable inputs cost, thus it is assumed that distance to the market sub-
stantially influences variable costs. 
6 Milk processing often represents milk pasteurization. 
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technical efficiency (PTE) indicating that inefficiency in management contributes 
most to overall technical inefficiency. Even though about 73% of farms overuse 
inputs each year, congestion-free efficiency is rather high (0.93) indicating that 
overuse of inputs does not lower farm efficiency as much as poor management 
does. Since about 65% of the farms demonstrate a unity PTE, it is concluded that 
managerial capacities are more or less similar on majority of farms, so perhaps it is 
the outside farm environment that lowers the impact of management resulting in 
relatively low PTE. 
The shares of farms operating under constant (CRS), increasing (IRS) and 
decreasing (DRS) returns to scale in Table 4 indicate that farms did not improve 
their scale efficiency by year 2000 in comparison with reference year 1996. The 
whole period farms mostly operated under IRS with its almost twice-decreased 
share in 2000. Thus, one of the trajectories farms could follow to gain efficiency is 
decreasing size. The most noticeable change in distribution of farms by returns to 
scale is observed after year 1998, once again proving a significant impact of finan-
cial crisis on efficiency and indicating the influential role of farm environment.  
Table 4 here 
After the technical efficiency is computed, multivariate relationships be-
tween efficiency, financial ratios and other farm characteristics are tested using a 
Tobit regression. The benchmark model includes all disaggregated financial ratios, 
e.g. long-term debts on loans and other, short-term debts to banks and to other 
creditors, accounts payable to suppliers, state, and workers. The estimates on fi-
nancial ratios are not highly significant for either of the ratio, except for SBC 
dummy. The hypothesis of disciplinary role of debts to commercial banks has no 
empirical support for settings of this study because none of the debts to banks has 
significant positive estimate. Instead of omitting any insignificant financial varia-
ble, the aggregated ratios are used. The nominators of several financial ratios were 
aggregated resulting in including total long-term debts, short-term debts to credit-
ing institutions and total accounts payable. The results of four Tobit models for 
technical efficiency and its components can be found in Table 5. The log-
likelihood measures indicate that the scale efficiency model has the best fit. Ac-
cording to Wald-test, random-effect tobit specifications are preferred over pooled 
tobit models.  
Table 5 here 
The models demonstrate no strong relation between capital structure and ef-
ficiency when debts to asset ratios are considered, except for the PTE (model 1). 
Accounts payable and managerial performance are positively related. This pro-
vides a weak evidence for a) debts to suppliers help to continue farm operation be-
cause they provide inputs and thus the farms that succeed to attract new trade cred-
its are more efficient and b) debts to suppliers have a “hard” nature and thus disci-
pline the management. Consistently significant negative estimates on SBC dummy 
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in all regressions provide strong evidence that loss-making farms that are never-
theless subsidized are less efficient. A negative estimate on subsidy to revenue ra-
tio (significant for model 2 and 3) corresponds with initial expectations and sup-
ports recent developments in agriculture. Subsidies remain declining in agriculture 
but since 2001 the state promotes interest rate subsidizing programs, thus focusing 
more on credit then subsidies.   
The coefficient on wages corrected for wage arrears are positive in all mod-
els. It is concluded that efficiency depends on performance of employees, which is 
first of all stimulated by the level of their earnings. To avoid unnecessary reason-
ing about importance of this factor for farm performance, it is enough to mention 
that average national wages in agriculture in 1996-2000 are slightly more then 
twice lower than wages in overall economy and almost three times lower than in 
industry. In accordance with expectations, farms that manage a highly productive 
herd generally have better management skills, which are likely used to improve the 
overall technical efficiency (model 2), not just productivity of the dairy herd. The 
ownership dummy, soil quality, percentage of processed milk and distance to 
Moscow are insignificant in most of the regressions with some exceptions for con-
gestion-free efficiency. Processing and distance depict negative estimates leading 
to the conclusion that milk processing is associated with a higher overuse of inputs 
and that the farthest located farms tend to overutilize inputs at greater level. The 
last finding is straightforward explainable for labor with limited working possibili-
ties in Moscow city due to travelling distance and for land that has lower oppor-
tunity costs in comparison with land near Moscow. Although not highly signifi-
cant, the estimates on distance and soil quality have expected signs. The estimates 
on size dummy are significantly negative in most of the regressions, except for 
scale efficiency, demonstrating that farm management is more efficient on smaller 
farms, e.g. farms with smaller agricultural land area in this context. A further ex-
amination in the model of scale efficiency confirms that a larger size does lead to a 
higher scale efficiency. But this positive effect is over-dissipated by its negative 
impact on pure technical efficiency, implying that a larger farm is much more dif-
ficult to manage.  
7. Conclusions and discussion  
In transition economies, the economists have studied the capital structure in 
two directions: as resulting factor and as explanatory factor. This paper comple-
ments the last studies by analysing the role of debts and subsidies in agricultural 
farm performance. The empirical application is done for dairy producers in Mos-
cow Region.  
Studying the impact of capital structure on firm performance in a transition 
economy is complicated by the existence of soft budget constraints. The analysis 
in this paper shows that debt to asset ratio does not fully depict the financial situa-
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tion on Russian farms. No strong relation between capital structure and efficiency 
is found. However, a strong support of a negative role of soft budget constraint is 
observed. Loss-making farms that accumulate high debts and are nevertheless get 
external finance by means of credits, loans, supply of inputs and subsidies are less 
efficient. This finding is in line with the Jensen’s free cash flow concept of finan-
cial theory that excess cash flows cause management laxness. However, it should 
be noted, unlike in study of NASR et al. (1998), debt to asset ratio does not reveal 
this conclusion for Russian agriculture settings. 
One of the policy implications for finding a negative role of excessive fi-
nance of loss-making farms is that the state should define measures for improving 
farm governance to make managers responsible for the financial state of farms. 
Secondly, since accounts payable help running farm operations, next to hardening 
budget constraints to discipline farm working mechanism, the state should elabo-
rate the alternatives for legal commercial (not trade) credit sources in agriculture. 
In light of these policy recommendations and recent changes in agricultural credit 
promoting programs in Russia, the forthcoming research can focus on analyzing 
the efficiency of subsidizing interest rate programs introduced in 2000-2001. Other 
important message to policy makers is that the state should bear in mind the priori-
ties for developments in agriculture when designing support programs. It is very 
unlikely that current subsidizing programs are helpful in agriculture keeping insol-
vent farms afloat, since subsidies are lower then losses of these farms and much 
lower then their debts. Thus, it is rather efficient to focus on subsidizing subsidy 
rate and it is inefficient to provide Kornai-type subsidies. 
The finding of this study signals about a necessity to hard the budget con-
straints, which is in line with studies of  CARLIN et al. (2000), Konings et al. 
(2002). However, this fact should not be exaggerated. Theoretical paper by CHE 
(2000) points to the link between existence of SBCs and macroeconomic situation. 
When budget constraints are soft because of concerns for macrostability, a com-
mitment to hard budget constraints is neither sufficient nor necessary for encour-
aging firms to improve their performance. Thus, an extension of this study would 
be on incorporating macroeconomic environment in the modeling framework to 
test the relevance of this assumption. 
In this paper the degree of farm inefficiency is assessed. Number of farms 
with unity overall technical efficiency is not high reaching 18% in the first and last 
year of the studied period.  Scale efficiency is higher than pure technical efficiency 
indicating that inefficiency in management contributes at most to overall technical 
inefficiency. Even though about 73% of farms overuse inputs each year, conges-
tion-free efficiency is rather high (0.93) indicating that surplus of inputs does not 
lower farm efficiency as much as poor management does. There is a clear positive 
trend in efficiency before and right after the financial crisis of 1998 in Russia. 
Other finding contributing to the discussion on efficient production scale and fur-
ther restructuring of farms is that farm management is more efficient on smaller 
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farms. The analysis shows that higher scale efficiency is dissipated by little less 
efficient managerial capacity to handle larger farms, which may suggest that own-
ers should take actions restructuring or dividing larger farms, for example, spin-
ning off less-related operations from each other in “super-farms”.  
Technical efficiency of dairy producers is highly determined by working 
environment: higher wages and lower wage arrears stimulate increase in efficien-
cy. This potential key to efficiency improvement should not be overlooked by 
farm managers in using to create more competitive working environment in agri-
culture, but also by policy-makers lobbying the agrarian interests. 
It should be also noted that the measures of farm performance may be over-
stated when only marketable part of production is analyzed. It is rather likely that 
farms market the outputs of a better quality and thus enjoy higher revenues per 
unit. However, the technical efficiency measure is a relative measure to the best 
practice frontier (best performing farm). It is not surprising to find higher efficien-
cy scores in comparison with other studies performed at the oblast level, since the 
sample in this study is rather homogeneous by construction. One remark can be 
made is that in other studies the technical efficiency scores for Moscow region are 
higher in comparison with other regions signaling about a relatively better perfor-
mance of agricultural producers. 
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Table 1. Debts and subsidies: Composition on Moscow Region dairy farms, 1996-2000  
 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 
Total obligations, % 100  100  100  100  100  
Total long-term debt, % 18 100 15 100 12 100 10 100 10 100 
Credits and loans, % 17 96 14 91 11 92 8 77 7 66 
Other long-term obligations, % 1 4 1 9 1 8 2 23 3 34 
Total short-term debt, % 82  85  88  90  90  
Short-term debts on credit and 
loans, % 
18 100 16 100 10 100 8 100 6 100 
To banks, % 3 17 3 21 5 49 4 47 2 25 
Other loans, % 15 83 13 79 5 51 4 53 5 75 
Accounts payable, % 64 100 69 100 77 100 82 100 84 100 
To suppliers, % 33 53 39 57 45 58 42 52 43 52 
To employees, % 8 12 8 12 7 9 5 6 4 4 
Social funds, % 5 8 7 9 9 12 12 15 13 15 
To government (tax), % 9 14 11 16 14 18 17 21 19 23 
To others, % 8 13 4 5 3 4 5 6 5 6 
Total obligations to revenue, % 80  126  146  89  81  
Total subsidies, ths. Rubles of 
year 1996 
337  486  275  88  101  
Share of subsidies in agricultural 
revenue, %  
9.1  12.7  10.3  2  2.4  
Subsidies to Crops, in % to total 26  19  16  18  41  
Subsidies Livestock, in % to total 73  81  83  81  47  
Subsidies for milk, in % to total 42  56  62  59  20  
Subsidies for milk, in % to live-
stock subsidies 
67  72  77  78  60  
Regional subsides, % to total 75  92  89  84  82  
Federal subsidies, % to total 25  8  11  16  18  
Table 2. Descriptive statistics of variables 








Inputs and Outputs 
Milk 1000 Roubles of 1996 3170 3435 148 29072 700 
Other output 1000 Roubles of 1996 949 1058 22 10005 700 
Variable input 1000 Roubles of 1996 3179 3683 153 33565 700 
Labor Number of workers 220 104 24 760 700 
Land Hectares 2501 1234 138 9136 700 
Capital 1000 Roubles of 1996 446 491 15 5560 700 
Heads of livestock heads 1687 928 237 7357 700 
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Financial ratios (at the beginning of year) 
Total liabilities to total as-
sets 
ratio 0.091 0.112 0.002 1.00 688 
Current liabilities to total 
assets 
ratio 0.081 0.097 0.001 1.00 688 
L-t debt to total assets ratio 0.011 0.027 0 0.402 688 
S-t debt to banks to total 
assets 
ratio 0.002 0.006 0 0.036 688 
Accounts payable to total 
assets 
ratio 0.065 0.088 0.001 1.000 688 
Subsidies 
Subsidies to revenue ratio 0.072 0.066 0 0.416 700 
Farm socio-economic characteristics 
Size  Dummy=1 for large 0.55 0.50 0 1 700 
Distance 100 km 0.81 0.39 .06 1.63 700 
Soil rating score (0…2) 96 19 57 192 700 
Dairy productivity 1000 kg per cow 3.1 1.2 0.7 7.3 700 
Wages per worker 1000 Roubles of 1996 6.98 3.48 0.39 49.36 700 
Share processed milk Ratio  0.06 0.19 0 1 700 
Ownership dummy Dummy=1 for  private 0.85 0.36 0 1 700 
 








Scale efficiency Congestion efficiency 









1996 0.85 0.10 18 0.88 0.09 58 0.97 0.05 19 0.93 0.07 24 
1997 0.86 0.09 16 0.90 0.08 66 0.96 0.06 18 0.94 0.07 31 
1998 0.81 0.10 10 0.85 0.10 60 0.95 0.06 11 0.90 0.09 15 
1999 0.84 0.11 18 0.90 0.09 64 0.95 0.06 22 0.94 0.08 27 
2000 0.88 0.09 18 0.91 0.08 72 0.97 0.04 20 0.94 0.07 27 
 
Table 4. Shares of farms with CRS (scale efficient), IRS and DRS (%) 
year Farms under CRS Farms under DRS Farms under IRS Total 
1996 19 8 73 100 
1997 18 14 67 100 
1998 11 11 79 100 
1999 22 25 53 100 
2000 20 41 39 100 
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Table 5. Random-effect Tobit regressions  








 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
 Coef. t Coef. t Coef. t Coef. t 
l-t debt to assets 0.131 1.11 0.185 1.58 0.032 0.47 0.080 0.85 
s-t debt to assets -0.057 -0.51 -0.023 -0.2 0.021 0.33 -0.068 -0.73 
debt payable to assets 0.071 1.94 0.042 1.18 -0.030 -1.43 0.020 0.67 
subsidy to revenue -0.067 -1.49 -0.119 -2.61 -0.063 -2.5 -0.034 -0.92 
dummy SBC -0.018 -2.65 -0.033 -4.78 -0.019 -4.94 -0.015 -2.62 
wages 0.011 10.07 0.014 12.86 0.003 5.53 0.007 7.45 
share processed milk 0.011 0.56 0.005 0.25 -0.008 -0.68 -0.035 -2.17 
dairy productivity 0.003 0.87 0.007 2.09 0.003 1.61 0.003 1.06 
soil quality 0.028 1.28 0.023 1.16 -0.002 -0.12 0.011 0.65 
distance -0.020 -1.69 -0.017 -1.58 0.002 0.29 -0.036 -3.86 
dummy size -0.031 -3.57 -0.013 -1.58 0.019 3.66 -0.037 -5.38 
dummy ownership 0.009 0.83 0.008 0.79 -0.002 -0.31 0.012 1.47 
constant 0.816 28.19 0.758 28.11 0.938 55.07 0.919 40.6 
Number of observations 688  688  688  688  
Log likelihood  847  838  1237  986  
Wald chi-2 198  345  120  195  
 
